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Abstract 
 
Cosmopolitanism, desire and the contracting of social relationships are 
enduring themes in both philosophy and social theory. In this paper I seek to 
explore these themes in order to ascertain what they might mean to disabled 
people and the ethos of ableism more generally. Modern Westernized life has 
since the Industrial Revolution been sited in cities fostering the growth of 
urban culture and an ethos of cosmopolitanism (Agamben, 2009; Beck, 2002; 
Cheah, 2006). The cosmopolitan outlook has become the signifier of that 
which is developed, advanced and civilized in society. The liberal project of 
the melting pot, of social tolerance is cast against the backdrop of city life 
(Brown, 2006).  The paper will first examine the trope of cosmopolitanism and 
disability including the place of ‘spaces’ for marginal peoples. Second, it will 
provide a perspective on the disabled flâneur (Campbell, 2009; Simmel, 1908; 
Young, 2005) who ambivalently claims ‘outsider-insidedness’ and finally the 
paper moves to consider the significant question of social inclusion and the 
government of aversion through the deployment of discourses of tolerance.  
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If the humanities has a future as cultural criticism, and cultural criticism has a 
task at the present moment, it is no doubt to return us to the human where we 
do not expect to find it, in its frailty and at the limits of its capacity to make 
sense. We would have to interrogate the emergence and vanishing of the 
human at the limits of what we can know, what we can hear, what we can see, 
what we can sense. (Butler, 2004, p. 151) 
 
Cosmopolitanism, desire and the contracting of social relationships are enduring 
themes in both philosophy and social theory (Benhabib, 2004; Doran, 2009; Popewitz, 
2008). In this paper I seek to explore these themes in order to ascertain what they 
might mean to disabled people and the ethos of ableism more generally. Modern 
Westernized life has since the Industrial Revolution been sited in cities fostering the 
growth of urban culture and an ethos of cosmopolitanism (Agamben, 2009; Beck, 
2002; Cheah, 2006).  
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The cosmopolitan outlook has become the signifier of that which is developed, 
advanced and civilized in society. The liberal project of the melting pot, of a social 
tolerance is cast against the backdrop of city life (Brown, 2006).  The paper will first 
examine the trope of cosmopolitanism and disability including the place of ‘spaces’ 
for marginal peoples and the trope of hospitality. Second, it will provide a perspective 
on the disabled flâneur (Campbell, 2009; Simmel, 1908; Young, 2005) who 
ambivalently claims ‘outsider-insidedness’ and finally the paper moves to consider 
the significant question of social inclusion (its paradoxes and guilt) and the 
government of aversion through the deployment of discourses of tolerance.  
 
Cosmopolitanism – a Higher Form of Life? 
 
Cosmopolitanism, the teleological ethos of human sophistication brings to the surface 
certain limits about modern life, what we should be, what kinds of norms we should 
emulate and forms the basis of community and the texture of its borders. At its hub is 
the Stoic idea of the kosmopolités, or the citizen of the world. As Lucius Seneca (4 
BCE – CE 65) puts it “truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this 
corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun” (Seneca, 
1987, p. 431). This calling forth, where ‘all’ are in our sphere of concern and 
obligation induces an exilic status away from the comforts of homosociality, “the 
warm nestling feeling of local loyalties” (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 11).  
More recently such a sentiment is typified in the Live Aid Ethiopian famine 
popular song catchcry of 1985 “we are the world, we are the children ….”1
Universalism and social inclusion can be regarded as key subsets of the 
cosmopolitan ideal: “the cosmopolitan embrace of social inclusion was elaborated in 
order to progress towards (Kant’s) perpetual peace housed in the virtues of a globally 
democratic citizenship …” (Doran, 2009, p. 175). Community and moral citizenship 
however were outside of any developments in the State (political citizenship). Hence, 
cosmopolitanism was not necessarily endorsing a metropolis of communitarian 
equity. Unlike Christoph Wieland (1733 – 1813) who distinguished between ‘world 
dwellers’ and ‘world citizens’ (the sages/teachers), Emmanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) is 
somewhat more egalitarian suggesting that all humans are citizens and that each can 
undertake moral discernment (Kleingeld, 1999). Urban convergences as sites of social 
integration and tolerance can be juxtaposed with a topography, the whole earth which 
has undergone processes of clearances and enclosures, the fencing of space which 
“has almost completely divided up between public and private property” (Hardt & 
Negri, 2009, p. vii). Herein land has been drafted as a forcefield for exclusion with the 
addition of no-go and anomalous zones. Later in this paper I discuss the figure of the 
cripped flâneur and how this person makes sense of enforced space. 
 (Westley, 
1991). In eighteenth century Europe cosmopolitanism denoted an attitude of open-
mindedness and impartiality, where there was a sharing of reason and the capacity to 
experience pleasure, pain and imagination among free men2. Such a moral view of 
cosmopolitanism takes its origin from Stoic thought which sees respect and moral 
recognition as paramount.  
Whilst cosmopolitanism should not be simply bifurcated as hospitality, Kant’s 
convergence of the two is significant. Kant proposed a project of a cosmopolitan right 
to hospitality. For Kant hospitality was not seen as a form of social engagement, but 
as a right (Kant, 2007, org 1795, II, 3rd Definitive Art, p. 21). Cosmopolitan 
hospitality is not a virtue of sociability and does not regulate relationships between 
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‘insiders’, that is, members of homosocial groups; rather hospitality based on a 
problematic of alterity 
 
… regulates the interactions of individuals who belong to different civic 
entities who encounter one another at the margins of bounded communities. A 
cosmopolitan ethic acts as a reminder of belonging to humanity beyond a 
singularity of identity. The right of hospitality is situated at the boundaries of 
the polity; it delimits civic space by regulating relations among members and 
strangers. (Benhabib, 2004, p. 27) 
 
Cosmopolitanism is a quality of exile and strangeness to one’s self through 
reflection. As an encounter of not knowing, cosmopolitanism is not easily cultivated. 
It is this regulation of the conduct of conduct in cosmopolitanism that I argue has the 
capacity to rethink and thus contribute to the undoing of ableist exclusions. The 
ancient Stoics and Cynics, whilst diverse thinkers, believed in cultivating a disposition 
where our belongingness to humanity should direct our conduct and outweigh other 
divisive attributes such as class, gender and origin (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 5). Obligation 
to others becomes co-operation in the form of alleviation of suffering and moral 
education for all.  
The Stoic worldview incorporates an inclusivity based on a chain of being 
among humans who are linked by a ‘divine breath’ (Aurelius, 1919, VII, 9, pp. 136 - 
137). Marcus Aurelius (121 –180 CE) Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher,  is firm 
in suggesting that co-operation extends to being with other humans even if they are 
belligerent or lacking in virtue (Aurelius, 1919, VI, 42, pp. 130-131.) The universe he 
argues is sociable (V, 30, p. 117). Humans acting in their singularity (rampant 
individualism or homosocial) are compared to an amputated hand (VIII, 34, p. 158), 
for the collective human is constitutive of the individual – like the limb which is 
constitutive of the body and not merely reckoned as an atomistic part (VII, 13, p. 
137). Flourishing then is both cosmopolitan and integrative. The integrative trend of 
cosmopolitanism has been given new life by scholars who focus on social processes 
and institutions, as Douzinas (2007, p. 135) puts it, this cosmopolitanism represents 
“… globalisation with a human face”. 
Cosmopolitanism is a mode of organising difference – a space of belonging 
and separateness, where the productive body recreates, desires or produces.  There is 
however a double gesture, a paradox that purports to include and in the process, 
excludes. At the global level universal benevolence and humanitas3 can act as a big 
stick for (in)corporation which frames and frames out belligerent States and cultural 
thought. Dikeç (2002) warns of being uncritical of the notion of hospitality, 
suggesting that the concept is assumed to be positive and a ready remedy to alleviate 
so-called burden. In a similar vein we may ask whether inclusion is a remedy or gloss 
over abjection?  Žižek (2008) has raised similar concerns about the role of the rhetoric 
of tolerance in detracting from issues of poverty and inequality. Beck (2002) in 
contrast to moves towards territorialism (nationalism) suggests a borderless 
cosmopolitanism where it is possible to imagine alternative ways of life and 
rationalities. Hence as a check on conceptual reductionism, thinking about 
cosmopolitanism needs to be linked with an understanding of biopolitics. Cities are 
meant to be sites of transgression where there is the possibility of incessant choice 
between products, people and even temporal enactments such as the fluidity between 
night and day as times of work and leisure.  
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Cosmopolitanism has been given new currency through the work of Hardt & 
Negri who view society as radically plural (cosmopolitan), as “a multiplicity of 
irreducible singularities” which may or may not act in unison (2009, p. 166). Hardt & 
Negri refer to relations of cosmopolitanism along the lines of the multitude who due 
to their characterisation as the poor, stand in opposition to the dominant relations of 
property sited in the State (2009, p. 39). The multitude are the new proletariat, a 
heterogeneous web of workers, immigrants, social movements, and non-government 
organisations. Whilst the visibly excluded form the multitude – the term becomes 
affirmative to incorporate “an open, inclusive social body, characterized by its 
boundlessness and its originary state of mixture among social ranks and groups” (p. 
40).  
Read against the grain in a negative turn, the multitude could denote a ‘silent 
majority’, that homosocial convergence who are affronted by a shift to equity in 
diversity. However returning to Hardt & Negri, the multitude may have some kind of 
flâneurial existence (I am not attempting to conflate Simmel with their work). The 
multitude is a process, an assemblage in the making “constantly transformed, 
enriched, constituted by a process of making” (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 173). In this 
process, a metamorphosis of new subjectivities (social singularities) emerge 
(Campbell, 2008, p. xii). One character arising out of the multitude is the disabled 
person in the form of the flâneur. Combined, they form the cripped flâneur who 
despite being under constant erasure can act as a familiar bystander and commentator. 
In the next section I focus on urban life and civility in a particular reading of the 
figure of the flâneur with disability. 
 
Crips Moving through Urban Life 
 
Disability rhetoric correctly postures that disability is an afterthought (Goggin & 
Newell, 2005) bound to an exclusionary ableist matrix that sets the terms of 
engagement.  The working model of inclusion is really only successful to the extent 
that people with disabilities are able to ‘opt in’, or be assimilated (normalized). A 
drive towards self-mastery may mean that it is not possible for some disabled people 
to be truly ‘free’ within the confines of liberalism. These people may lose person 
status because they fail to meet certain criterion. Under liberalism, the production and 
governing of disability is facilitated, in part, through its morphing into a mere logical 
and discrete etiological classification and ensuing ontological space. Although 
disability characterises a significant portion of the multitude (between 20 – 40% of the 
population on some reckoning) it is driven down through a process of actuarial 
reductionism to be ‘discreet and insular’ (appended to around 13% of the population) 
– becoming exceptional rather than usual. The performative acts of the ‘logic of 
identity’ reduce the disparity and difference of disabled bodies to a unity (see 
Foucault, 1980, p. 117). This model of inclusion assumes that the people who cannot, 
do not, or otherwise refuse to, ‘opt in’, will developmentally progress towards 
autonomy over time. Whilst there has been work on the built environment and cities, 
most notably Gleeson (1999) and Imrie (1996) which recognises that disabled people 
have always been part of the city, it is the terms of their exclusion and the origin of 
their invisibility that needs further scrutiny. 
Tendencies toward disability are put out by pathologizing desire.4 Certain 
kinds of aberrancy radically disturb, challenge and support the notion of disability as 
harm which interpolates in the politics of disability as offence and characterologically 
in turn – disability as offensive brings out the tension between cosmopolitanism and 
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the rhetoric of inclusion.  Spatiality and access to the city is inhibited by an enduring 
attitude that disability is tentative and can ultimately be cured or treated.  This has 
induced a sense in the development industry that not only is access expensive it is 
ultimately a waste of time. (Campbell, 2009; Imrie, 1996).  There is another way of 
orientating disability, being disabled within an ableist trajectory, that of acting as the 
bystander, a commentator in the form of the sociologically elusive flâneur. Georg 
Simmel (1908, p. 134) writing in a different context and time describes  
  
… the wanderer, so to speak, who, although he has gone no further, has not 
quite got over the freedom of coming and going. He is fixed within a certain 
spatial circle -  or within a group whose boundaries are analogous to spatial 
boundaries - but his position within it is fundamentally affected by the fact that 
he does not belong in it initially and that he brings qualities into it that are not, 
and cannot be, indigenous to it.  
 
I am grasping the flâneur, recognising that the figure has an historical and 
locational context. There is an unpredictability to the flâneur. Of course there are 
different takes on the flâneur relating to his receptivity towards others. Self absorption 
is complex, for while there maybe limited recognition by the flâneur of other flâneurs 
in the metropolis, Williams argues that “… the flâneur must take into account the tales 
of fellow-flâneurs and competitors, a conceptual and spatio-temporal impossibility 
which spells doom for all master-narratives and paradigmatic discourses” (1997, p. 
821). Certainly survival in the city amongst homeless people and marginal dwellers is 
very dependent upon the transmission of cultural memory and subjugated knowledges 
about opportunities, services and dangers (Dunn, 2003; Harter, Berquist, Titsworth, 
Noval & Brokaw, 2005; Rowe, Kloos, Chinman, Davidson & Cross, 2001). 
The flâneur embraces the conundrum of alienated belongingness, being an 
outsider with insiderness. She is both constituted as well as dispossessed by the 
impulse towards belongingness (Butler, 2004, p. 24). Her radical outsideredness 
enables her to apprehend and as well become an object that is apprehended. The 
existence of disability bios (a proper way of living), puts out fear and possibility. 
Consider the honour of being spectacle, where the staree becomes a stance of 
resistance for instance, the self managed freak show performance or disability/crip 
culture (see Figure 1). Pivoting the starer turns toward and turns away.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Disabled & Proud - I Have More Chromosomes Than You Do!  
 
Source: 4th Annual Disability Pride Parade in Chicago 2007. Photo: Sunil Chatur, Accessed 
01/01/2010, http://farm2.static.flickr.com/1015/884189913_edf94f142d.jpg 
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This is the conflict over liminality that many disabled people experience. 
Imposed margins that erase until one conforms to ableist norm emulation, places 
where the zones of exception are sub-standard inducing melancholy. How does the 
person with a disability negotiate the expectations and compulsions of Ableism? In 
other words, do they choose to conform or hypermimic ableism or do they go it alone 
and explore alternative ways of being? People with impairments have impairment – 
mediated proprioceptive ways of experiencing being in the world. In contrast there is 
the unspeakability of communality and commonality where disabled people can, as 
Overboe does in his spasms that “give [him] great joy… [becoming] a life-affirming 
presence” (2007, p. 221).  
On guard against romanticization, the boundary rider smugly oscillates in and 
out of the margins of deviancy.  Walter Benjamin in exploring the characters of the 
metropolis looked to the margins – “he singled out the flâneur, prostitute, collector – 
historical figures whose existence was precarious economically in their own time …. 
The dynamics of industrialism ultimately threaten these social types with extinction” 
(Buck-Morss, 1986, p. 101). These are the people who even today are relegated to the 
dirty jobs typical of workhouses and sheltered workshops. It is this status of 
precariousness that I believe works to extend flâneurism to disability. Disabled 
people often lived precariously both economically and ontologically relying on the 
existence of a prevailing ethos of goodwill. Campbell compellingly argues “[a]ll these 
people are in effect strangers in ableist homelands – who because of their strangeness 
have the possibility of a new vision or orientation” (2009, p. 161). Indeed disabled 
people throughout urbanized history have carried on the role of the subaltern flâneur 
who is included in his exclusion and whose defining characteristic is not in the 
expression but rather in the desire (Young, 2005). It would be easy to see the flâneur 
as the prophet, who stands apart, instead the flâneur just goes about, just ‘is’. Simmel 
again stresses that:  
 
… the stranger is an element of the group itself … an element whose 
membership within the group involves both being outside it and confronting it.  
… Factors of distance and revulsion work to create a form of being together.  
(1908, p. 144) 
 
Here it can be argued that that the flâneur as an exception does not validate the 
rule of the group, rather the flâneur as an exception is contained within the rules of 
public life (cf. Ewald, 1992). Urban landscapes are littered with disabled street sellers 
who are at once revealed but veiled. These flâneurs as Wilson (1992, p. 94) puts it 
“spends most of [their] day simply looking at the urban spectacle”. Present but 
anonymous, the flâneur acts as “a solitary onlooker” (p. 95). Unlike the Muselmann of 
the Nazi death camps who is obliterated, the solitary onlooker is noticed even in the 
form of a stare. The flâneur is not always a romanticised image, and has been figured 
as lapsing into a kind of retreatism. In 1857, de Rattier referred to the flâneur as a 
non-entity, “constant rubberneck” an “inconsequential type” (Benjamin, 1973, p. 54). 
This gloomy casting recalls the figure who roams not the streets but the confinement 
of the camp who is ontologically terrifying because he is questionable: 
 
…non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead in them, 
already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one 
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hesitates to call their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as 
they are too tired to understand.”  (Agamben, 1999, p. 44) 
 
The flâneur in Poe’s (1912) poem ‘The Man of the Crowd’ does not have an 
independent existence of other human beings, but this does not mean he has an 
enabling interpenetrative relation with them. This flâneur is a sign of life lived as 
tentative and precarious. The excluded are not just to be found in their banishment, 
cities have always contained banned persons who intermingle but by being denied 
political life (zoe), and in their ambivalence, are erased or disappeared. As Wilson 
(1992) retorts:  
 
The society which thus constituted itself as a spectacle was a society of 
outsiders, and the boulevards and cafes offered … a homeland for these 
individuals without a home. (p. 96) 
 
We are so used to the wanderer being seen as a cast (banished) entity it would 
be easy to see him as an alien. Simmel points to the paradox of the flâneur being our 
own excluded [person] and thus represents something of us that is put out: 
 
Included in his exclusion: the stranger is an element of the group itself … an 
element whose membership within the group involves both being outside it 
and confronting it … factors of distance and revulsion work to create a form of 
being together. (Simmel, 1908, p. 144) 
 
The flâneur unveils the inclusion of cosmopolitanism to the extent that his 
suffocation is contrasted. Cosmopolitanism is an ethos that shapes the flâneurian 
landscape which insinuates possibility and also a fear of degeneration and decay 
(Popewitz, 2008). Again Poe’s narrator in ‘The Man of the Crowd’ captures this 
paradox well: 
 
… there arose confusedly and paradoxically within my mind, the ideas of vast 
mental power, of caution, of penuriousness, of avarice, of coolness, of malice, 
of blood-thirstiness, of triumph, of merriment, of excessive terror, of intense—
of extreme despair. I felt singularly aroused, startled, fascinated. 'How wild a 
history,' I said to myself, 'is written within that bosom!' Then came a craving 
desire to keep the man in view—to know more of him. (Poe, 1912, p. 105) 
 
The tension is very real for nuances of neoliberalism are not just about 
economic relations shaping social and political relations, but that the point of focus is 
not as in Poe’s time, exchange, but rather competition (Foucault, 2008, p. 12). Living 
in the now and not yet, as outsiders not quite inside; requires a disposition or habit of 
contemporariness. Contemporariness signifies a relationship with the present but also 
a distance, a critical space from it. As Agamben explains:  
 
Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those 
who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. 
They are in this sense irrelevant [inattuale]. But precisely because of this 
condition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they are 
more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time. (2009, p. 
40) 
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The notion of disconnection is not the same as disengagement. The flâneur 
“knows he is the face in the crowd. And, as such, by virtue of that very knowing, the 
poet is a man apart even though he might well appear to be a man like any other 
(Tester, 1994, p. 4). In that way the flâneur is an exemplar of Agamben’s 
contemporary person. A queering of contemporariness is the grasping and holding 
tight to ambivalence and obscurity which is so fundamental to the alternate lifestyle. 
This is obtained through fixing the gaze not on our era’s light but the underbelly, or in 
Agamben’s language ‘darkness’ – which shines into the staree. In this sense, the 
contemporary queered and cripped person, in touching an elusive imaginary sees the 
now and the emergent not as a death drive, but in terms of unlivedness: 
 
… the present is nothing other than this unlived element in everything that is 
lived. That which impedes access to the present is precisely the mass of what 
for some reason (its traumatic character, its excessive nearness) we have not 
managed to live. The attention to this “unlived” is the life of the contemporary. 
(Agamben 2009, p. 51) 
 
A cosmopolitan inclusion invokes a play where borders and limits are 
conceived, where “being must be conceived of as presence or absence on the basis of 
the possibility of play and not the other way around” (Derrida, 1967, p. 369). Whilst 
the flâneur in her contemporariness as the stranger arrives with questions “posing 
questions, making one pose questions therefore challenging the order” (Dikeç, 2002, 
p.227), she can only partake in inclusive encounters to the extent that she remains  
‘guest’. A transformed guest status depends upon a tenuous goodwill that deprives the 
entrenchment of heterosocial valuing. The figure of flâneur postulates about frontiers 
of freedom and:  
 
… being-with-others in the modern urban spaces of the city. Freedom because 
the figure revolves around the dialectic of self-definition and definition from 
outside (although this freedom is perhaps something more by way of a curse 
than a promise); the meaning of (or lack of meaning) of existence because the 
figure is about the flux of life and the requirements to make its meaning for 
one’s self. (Tester, 1994,  p. 8) 
 
Disabled people need to claim back territory, refute the ableist land-grab by 
insisting on a sojourner status where there is present becoming. Forfeiture of the guest 
status (echos of recipients of care) to that of Master, even in a collectivity, presumes 
the non-provisional status of disability, which techno-science views as tentative 
(Campbell, 2009). Cosmopolitanism as comparative instantiation inscribes difference 
into hierarchies of those people civilised and those not. The incomprehensibility of a 
disability orientation is marked out in the roaming of space and the desire to follow 
the heteroglossia of shadows. In the next section the theme of the cosmopolitan 
outlook and the figure of the flâneur are brought to bear on the subject of inclusion, its 
paradoxes and anxieties.  
 
Paradoxes of Social Inclusion 
 
The quest for social inclusion whilst containing a commendable ethos holds a number 
of uncertain paradoxes. The ‘bringing in’ of inclusion can mask the fact that the Other 
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is already among us, despite her unimagined presence (such as the flâneur I have 
already discussed). Even during the period known as the Great Confinement in 
Europe the vast majority of disabled people existed in the community and were not set 
aside (Wright, 1997). Social inclusion because of its links to sovereignty and 
governmentality where states of exception are decided, becomes a borderline concept, 
not as uncertainty but to ascertain the outermost sphere of territory, obligation and 
indeed humanness (c.f. Schmitt, 2005).  
The deployment of a strategy of social inclusion (a form of political 
cosmopolitanism) becomes an immunisation against the guilt of a singular and 
particularised inclusion. For Esposito (2008), community and immunity are relations 
of “contrast and juxtaposition” (Campbell, 2008, p. ix). Hospitality assumes a 
governmental imperative whereby the host is in charge of territory and resources. 
Immunization can be a way of, an abstention from communal obligation and the 
“expropriative effects” and excesses of community (Campbell, 2008, p. xi). Such 
property relations Derrida observes compromise hospitality: “hospitality limits itself 
from the threshold on its own threshold, it measures it always remains at its own 
threshold, it governs the threshold – and in this measure it prohibits in some way 
crossing the threshold that it seems to allow crossing” (Derrida, 1999, p. 39). 
Successful crossing over must involve to a large extent some kind of alterity 
disavowal, a purging of difference and a submission to a hegemonic ethos.  
This language of threshold also appears in the thought of Agamben to denote a 
journey that cannot be completed. The project to maintain the distinction between a 
bare (unfit) life and a good (and proper) life relies upon “the exclusion (which is 
simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 7). Hence as Norris 
puts it “bare life is a necessary part of the good life, in that the good life is both what 
bare life is not and what bare life becomes” (Norris, 2000, p. 41). Such a project does 
not comfortably tolerate mixtures. Hybridity under inclusion fuses into a non-descript 
melting pot where the particularity of differences evaporates and there is a sense of 
certainty in compartmentalisation. As Wendy Brown (2006) observes discourses of 
tolerance are engaged as part of a kit in hostility management that give an impression 
of inclusion but result in identity management. In effect bodies become sites for 
contestation and political concentration. In tolerating difference, cosmopolitanism 
subsumes and consumes that (inferior) difference into an unproblematic normative 
sameness which as Brown argues “places the object of tolerance outside the universal, 
positioning it as needing tolerance and hence as a lower form of life” (Brown, 2006, 
p. 187). We come full circle as cosmopolitanism and its reckoning with exclusion 
evokes an anxiety and is ungirded by a sense of guilt.  
 
The Guilt of Inclusion 
 
The disabled body induces a radical collision with ableist normativity and the 
possibility of limiting hospitality towards the ‘remainders’ of society (See Figure 2). 
This collision can distil a terror of strangeness to the thought that disability can be a 
possibility. On the face of it ableism, in promulgating a state of exception in the figure 
of the homo sacer,5 the unfit, subhuman, disordered, or perverted, who it is declared 
outside of life (political existence) yet included in the social order in the form of their 
exclusion prompts on the part of abled people an existence that operates under a 
permanent culpa esse, a feeling of indebted guilt in being included (c.f. Agamben 
1998). Disabled people allegorically are made the sacrificial scapegoat of Leviticus 
16. This guilt can be heightened when there is a greater threat or awareness about the 
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provisionality of normalcy. Hence we can speak of ableism operating under a 
permanent guilt of inclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: “I have no one”   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Affordable Housing Institute, Boston: Accessed 10/01/2010 
http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/us/wp-content/uploads/homeless_man_begging_small.jpg 
 
Cosmopolitan hospitality while signifying openness has a trajectory, at least in 
Kant, of limit, allowing for the ‘stranger’ to be sent away  provided that “…this can 
be done without causing his death …” (Kant, 2007, §II, p. 18) making it quite clear 
that hospitality is a public event. And we know this in terms of the regulatory function 
of law through the police and military that invokes the public nature (publicité) to 
intervene in the private (privé). It is outside the purview of this article to fully 
consider the tenuousness of cosmopolitan hospitality however, for the record I 
mention three instances that have currency to matters of disablement and ableism. The 
first, notable group are the disabled “unrehabilitatable” who can only humanely be put 
in the institution or be voided by other mechanisms.6 Another sent away group are 
those predicted as ineffably dangerous, by use of indeterminate sentencing laws 
(Campbell, 1993). Finally there is the criminal who is banished through deportation, 
even though in the Australian situation, that person may have a regularised resident 
status. Emmerich de Vattel, (1714 – 1767) in Law of Peoples or Principles of Natural 
Law (1758) acknowledged that foreigners who might “cause … disorder hurtful to the 
public welfare” could be sent off elsewhere.”7  
The Commonwealth of Australia Migration Act 1958, s. 201, currently allows 
for deportation where a person who is not an Australian citizen, has been convicted of 
a crime attracting at least a year’s imprisonment and the crime was committed within 
the first ten years of the person’s residence in Australia. Many of these people have 
mental illness or some impaired capacity. Such is the precariousness of the cripped 
flâneur, who if not sent away, is through economic desperation, a being-for-sale. 
Benjamin suggests that “the flâneur takes the concept of being-for-sale itself for a 
walk. Just as the department store is his last haunt, so his last incarnation is as 
sandwichman” (Benjamin, 1972 [1935], Vol. 5, p. 562).   
The cripped flâneur is a being-for-sale to the lowest bidder. In the precarious 
labour market8 any job will do, for she in her desperation is fully compliant. For the 
disabled person, whilst she commonly takes up a position of sandwichman, the 
department store is rarely her haunt. Aesthetic unacceptability means she simply can’t 
get in. 
The political concept of people enshrined in the documents of the French 
Revolution and subsequent human rights instruments foreground two different 
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conceptions – people as a whole, the social body cast against multiple excluded 
bodied (the aberrant)  or in the alternative an inclusive whole without outsiders. As 
Agamben notes: 
… the concept of people always already contains within itself the fundamental 
bio-political fracture. It is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is 
a part as well as what cannot belong to the whole in which it is always already 
included. (2000, p. 31.2)  
 
This observation by Agamben should not come as a surprise as it was 
Heidegger who argued that feeling guilty is the very structure of human existence. 
“[Here] we derive our primordial notion of ‘lack’ or ‘nothingness’, and the experience 
of ourselves as lacking, incomplete, failing to live up to our-selves, our own 
potentials: guilty” (Heidegger, 1962, para. 284). Yet the word ‘guilt’ in German 
(schuldig wird) denotes obligation: “Someone becomes guilty in respect of another 
(schuldig wird) … he causes a lack in the existence of another, that he becomes the 
reason for a lack of existence of another.” (Buber, 1961, p. 165) 
Agamben’s observations of “biopower”, as one that individualizes through 
disciplinary practices also massifies, generalizes and normalizes by making people a 
population. The incitement to normalize has at its core a process of differentiation 
(aspiring to the norm that one does not meet). Indeed normalization as previously 
mentioned hinges on a belief in the minority status and enumerative containability of 
disabled people – rather than being conceived more as a hybrid, fluid, significant 
component of the bio-population where recognition of such a cohort can de-throne 
ableist claims to naturalization rather than a fabricated ethos. To claim inclusion one 
must have a permanent under-cohort of the excluded. By claiming one’s own identity 
it must be done always in reference to that from which one is distinguished.  
 
Where to Next? 
 
Moral cosmopolitanism may be an antidote to the impugned version of social 
inclusion. Stoic thought reminds us that community is about passion, desire and 
openness. Emotions about belongingness and boundaries, both positive and negative 
do not just involve evaluative judgements but are learned and therefore need to be 
cultivated as part of a child’s moral development (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 20). 
Developments in designating disability through a relational model – in the 
confrontation of the self and the environment, others in an internal/external dynamic 
challenge the dominant perspective in the western philosophical tradition that identity 
precedes relation, that the constitution of subjectivity is free of the other (Campbell, 
2009). Beingness in relation, a relative disposition (pros ti pōs echon) – the state of 
one’s existence is defined by something outside it (La Cugna, 1992, p. 58), hence the 
necessity of venturing into the world of the precarious. 
Cosmopolitanism as an outlook, particularly as an urban trajectory a site for 
the multitude to explore diversity, can act as hubs in the government of difference 
whilst providing an underbelly of resistance and an alternative commentary of city 
life. By investigating different readings of the cosmopolitan, this paper articulates a 
reclamation and enactment of a version of cosmopolitanism based on gesturing 
toward alterity which cultivates a reflection on strangeness and the exilic life. The 
paper notes the tensions and flashpoints between proffering disability as offensive (to 
human characterisation) and cosmopolitan inclusion. Additionally further research 
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and theoretical work is required on the beneficiaries of inclusion – those (en)abled 
people who experience, albeit unacknowledged indebted guilt at being assumptively 
included. It has outlined the insights of Agamben (2009) on the outlook, of whom he 
calls the contemporary person, a disposition that heightens the perceptiveness and 
grasping of one’s own time. The enigmatic and elusive characterisation of the cripped 
flâneur becomes a point for the reflection on the civility of modernity.  Engagement at 
the margins with the flâneurial figure may help us as Butler (2004) notes in the 
opening epigram to appraise the human in unlikely places.   Marginal beingness  
provides clarity and insight into the complexity and contradictions of discourses of 
social inclusion. 
 
Notes 
 
1 As late as 2009, the song “We are the World” sold more than 20 million units and raised 
over $63 million for humanitarian aid in Africa and the US and was revived in 2010 as “We 
are the World 25 for Haiti”. 
2 Apropos the journal’s inclusive language police, when ‘man’ or ‘men’ are used I am referring 
to males or retaining the historical sexed language.  The gendered language of the time is 
based on the inference that men were primarily capable of reasoning. 
3 Denoting from the Greek, culture and education. 
4 Sometimes called negative enhancement. 
5 “… who maybe killed and not yet sacrificed”. (Agamben, 1998, p. 8). 
6 Euthanasia being an example. 
7 Ugly laws have used to ‘move along’ the locals from pubic places. See Schweik (2009). 
8 The 2003 Australian Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers, reports lower participation of 
people with disability in the labour force, disability decreases the probability of participation 
by 0.24 for males and 0.2 for females (ABS, 2004). The labour gap in participation between 
people with and without disability remained constant between 1988 – 2003  (AIHW, 
2008).The labour force participation rate was lower (53%) for disabled people compared to 
81% for workers not identifying as having impairment.  People with disability represent a 
significant low income population with the gross medium income per week of $255 
compared to $501 for those not identifying as disabled. Indeed the principle source of 
personal income was derived by the majority of people with disability (42.9%) is from 
government pensions or allowances.  Only 35% people with disability of compared with 
62% of the rest of the population received a wage or salary as their principle source of 
income. 
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